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On the Mark? Big Tobacco Asserts
Property Rights on Cigarette Packaging
Benjamin A. Hackman*
The battle between Big Tobacco and the United States government
has recently taken an interesting twist. In 2009, President Barack Obama
signed' the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
("FSPTCA").2 The FSPTCA gives the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") authority to regulate tobacco products.3 The FSPTCA also
amends the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act4 to require
cigarette makers to place larger warning labels on their advertisements
and product packaging. 5 About two months after President Obama
signed the FSPTCA, R.J. Reynolds and five other tobacco companies
sued the FDA in federal court in Kentucky.6 They alleged that the
FSPTCA violates the federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause 7 because FSPTCA-mandated warning labels infringe the
trademarks and trade dress that tobacco companies print on cigarette

* B.A., Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 2003; M.A., Philosophy,
University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005; J.D., The Dickinson School of Law of The
Pennsylvania State University, 2011. I thank my wife; my family and friends; my
professors; Paul Baker; Tim Dewald; Bret Shaffer; and Miflosa and Kikyo; without
whom this Comment would not have been possible. Thanks to the staff of the Penn State
InternationalLaw Review for their fine work. All errors are mine.
1. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. U.S., No. 1:09CV-l l7-M, slip op. at I (W.D.
Ky. Jan. 5, 2010), 2010 WL 65013. See also Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs
Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15.
2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.).
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (2009).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(4) (2009).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2009).
6. See Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV-1 17-M (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL
2842131.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the FSPTCA
packs.8
unconstitutional9 and to enjoin the FDA from enforcing it.' 0
This Comment aims to address two issues underlying the claim that
FSPTCA warning labels constitute a Fifth Amendment taking of tobacco
companies' trademarks or trade dress." First, are trademarks or trade
dress a cognizable property interest under the federal Constitution?
Second, is the FSPTCA a government regulation that amounts to a
taking? To contextualize these issues, I will first discuss similar issues
raised by tobacco warning-label litigation in Europe. Even if trademarks
or trade dress are deemed to be a constitutionally cognizable property
interest in the United States, FSPTCA-mandated warning labels probably
do not amount to a taking.
This Comment will discuss the tobacco companies' complaint only
as it was originally filed and will examine only the complaint's Fifth
Amendment takings claim.12 I will not analyze whether a federal district
court has jurisdiction over the takings claim.' 3 Moreover, I will
disregard how a takings analysis might change if some of the plaintiffs
effectively waived their Fifth Amendment rights by signing the Master
Settlement Agreement of 1998, for some of the plaintiffs have not signed
it. 14 Lastly, I will not address the just-compensation aspect of the
plaintiffs' takings claim.
I.

TOBACCO WARNING-LABEL LITIGATION IN EUROPE

On June 5, 2001,' the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union ("EU") adopted a Directive' 6 to regulate how tobacco
products are made, presented and sold in EU member states.' 7 The
Directive clarifies amendments to previous Directives that regulated

8. See Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV-1 l7-M, 66 (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL
2842131.
9. See id. TI 123, 124, & 126.
10. See id. TT 174-79.
I1. See id. IT 30, 66 & 119, Prayer for Relief E.
12. 1 will not analyze the complaint's free-speech and due-process claims.
13. The district court issued a decision on R.J. Reynolds's lawsuit in early January
2010. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
takings claims because the Tucker Act requires the plaintiffs to seek relief for such claims
in the Court of Federal Claims. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678
F.Supp.2d 512, 539-540 (W.D. Ky. 2010). Thus, the basic Fifth Amendment takings
issues remain unsettled.
14. See id. 8 & 11.
15. See Arnold Andre GmbH & Co. KG v. Landrat des Kreises Herford 2005 1
C.M.L.R. 25.
16. Council Directive 01/37, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
17. See id.
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tobacco warning labels in the European Community.1 8 The Directive
recites that "substantial differences" exist among member states' laws
governing the production, advertisement and sale of tobacco, and that
these differences inhibit the European Community's tobacco market.' 9
The Directive states that these laws should be made uniform across
member states in order to eliminate trade barriers, "while leaving
Member States the possibility of introducing, under certain conditions,
such requirements as they consider necessary in order to guarantee the
protection of the health of individuals." 2 0 The Directive also says that
warning labels vary among the member states,21 and that these
differences too are likely to inhibit the European Community's tobacco
market "and should therefore be eliminated." 2 2 The Directive bans terms
such as "low-tar," "light," and "mild" from cigarette packs because these
terms may lead consumers to believe that cigarettes so branded are less
harmful than regular cigarettes. 23
Three tobacco companies challenged Articles 5 and 7 of the
Directive. Article 5 sets forth label requirements for tobacco packaging.
It mandates that the two "most visible" surfaces of every cigarette pack
18. See id. recital T 1.
19. See id. recital 2.
20. Id. T 3.
21. Council Directive 01/37, recital 19, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
22. Id. Cases decided after the Directive was passed show that eliminating barriers
to trade in Europe's tobacco market is a disingenuous reason for enacting the Directive.
In Case C-210/03, Queen ex re. Swedish Match AB v. Sec'y of State for Health 2004
E.C.R. 1-11893, the United Kingdom, on behalf of Swedish Match, challenged the
Directive on the basis that Directive Article 8 was overbroad because it completely
prohibited advertising of certain types of chewing tobacco in the European Community.
Case C-210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec 'y of State for Health 2004 E.C.R.
1-11893,
1, 21(2)(c). The Court of Justice held that the Community Legislature did
not exceed its discretion in enacting the Directive pursuant to Article 95(3) EC, which
gives the Community legislature wide latitude in passing laws aimed at protecting public
health. Case C-210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec'y of State for Health
2004 E.C.R. 1-11893, % 56, 58. But the Court of Justice held that no other measure
besides the Directive's warning-label requirements would have as effectively protected
public health, "inasmuch as [other measures] would let a product which is in any event
harmful gain a place in the market." Case C-210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v.
Sec 'y of State for Health 2004 E.C.R. 1-11893, 57. Moreover, the Court of Justice held
that the Directive did not manifestly violate the principle of proportionality, which
requires that laws that the Community legislature enacts be "appropriate for attaining the
objective pursued and . .. not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it." Case C210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec'y of State for Health 2004 E.C.R. I11893,%147 & 58. Yet the Court of Justice qualified this standard of review by adding
that the Community legislature must be granted wide discretion to enact laws promoting
public health and that the court would strike down such a law only if it was "manifestly
inappropriate in relation to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to
Case C-210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v Sec 'y of State for
pursue ...
Health 2004 E.C.R. 1-11893, 148.
23. See Council Directive 01/37, recital 27, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
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and carton display a warning label. 24 At least 30%25 of "most visible
surface" 26 of each cigarette pack and carton must bear a general
warning.27 If the member state has two official languages, then the
warning-label area increases to at least 32%, and if the member state has
three official languages, then the warning-label area increases to at least
35%.28 The warning need not appear on the top half of cigarette packs
but must appear on them regularly.29
Article 5 of the Directive requires a second warning3 0 "on the other
most visible surface of' each cigarette pack and carton. 3' This warning
must cover at least 40% of the surface on which it appears.32 If the
member state has two official languages, then this warning label must
cover 45% of the surface area.33 If the member state has three languages,
then this warning label must cover 50% of the surface area.34
Additionally, Article 5 of the Directive requires that 10% of a side
panel of each cigarette pack and carton display the product's tar, nicotine
and carbon monoxide yields.3 5 This figure increases to 12% for member
states with two official languages, and to 15% for member states with
three official languages.3 6
Article 7 of the Directive bans certain descriptors from tobacco
packaging.3 7 Article 7 provides: "[W]ithout prejudice to Article 5(1),
texts, names, trade marks and figurative or other signs suggesting that a
particular tobacco product is less harmful than others shall not be used on
the packaging of tobacco products." 38
British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, and Japan Tobacco
sought judicial review of whether the United Kingdom was required to

24. Id art. 5(2)(a)(2).
25. Council Directive 01/37, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J.(L 194) 26.
26. See id.
art. 5(2)(a)(2). Presumably, the most visible surface of a cigarette pack is
its front panel.
27. The general warning labels the Directive mandates are "Smoking kills/Smoking
can kill," or "Smoking seriously harms you and others around you." Id. art. 5(2)(a)(2).
28. See id.
art. 5(5).
29. See id. art. 5(2).
30. See id art. 5(2)(b), which refers to warnings listed in Annex I.
31. Council Directive 01/37, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
32. See id.
art. 5(5).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
art. 5(l).
36. See Council Directive 01/37, art. 5(1), 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
37. Claimants contended Article 7 forbid them from using descriptive terms as
"light" or "mild" on their cigarette packs. See Case C-491/01, Queen v. Sec'y of State
for Health, ex parte British Am. Tobacco (Inv.) Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 2002
E.C.R. 1-1 1453, T 143 [hereinafter British Am. Tobacco].
38. Council Directive 01/37, art. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
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incorporate the Directive into its national laws. 39 In December 2001, the
High Court of Justice (England and Wales), Queen's Bench Division,
asked the Court of Justice of the European Communities to interpret the
Directive and rule on its validity. The UK court asked whether the
Directive infringed40 the fundamental right to property; Article 295 EC,
which provided that the EC Treaty would not infringe member states'
systems of property ownership; 41 or Article 20 of the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). 42 British American
Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco argued that the Directive infringed all
three.43 They argued that the large warning labels prescribed by Article 5
infringed their intellectual-property rights.4 British American Tobacco
and Imperial Tobacco complained that the mandated warning labels
would overwhelm the appearance of their tobacco packaging and prevent
them from using their trademarks.45
Japan Tobacco argued that because use of its "Mild Seven"
trademark in the European Community would be forbidden by Article
7,46 the Directive infringed Japan Tobacco's right to property, "a
fundamental human right in the Community legal order" that Article 1 of
the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights protects
and that is set forth in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.47 Luxembourg and Greece agreed with the tobacco
companies' arguments.48
Several other European governmentS49 took the opposite position.
These governments argued that the Directive did not affect rules
governing the property-ownership systems of European Community

39. See The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health ex parte British Am. Tobacco (Inv.)
Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd., supported by Japan Tobacco Inc. and JT International S
2003 1 C.M.L.R. 14 at H3 (p. 395), Official Journal 2003 C31/3, C-491/01.
40. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 25.
41. The treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated
version) Article 295 provides: "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member
States governing the system of property ownership." Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 296 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
42. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs
Article 20 says that use of a trademark in the course of trade should not be encumbered
by special requirements. See BritishAm. Tobacco, supra note 37, T 143.
43. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 143.
44. See id. 1143.
45. See id.
46. Id. t 27 & 144.
47. Id. 1144.
48. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 145.
49. The United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands opposed
the claimants. See id. 1 146.
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member countries, 50 did not improperly infringe the fundamental right to
property,5 I and did not contradict TRIPs Article 20.52
A.

Infringement ofArticle 295 EC

The Court of Justice ruled that the Directive did not infringe Article
295 EC, which provides that "[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership." 53
The court's brief analysis seems to be based on a distinction between a
member state's system of property ownership and particularrights in
property that the member state recognizes. The Directive could infringe
the latter without prejudicing the former.54 The court held that the
Directive did not impinge on rules governing the system of property
ownership in member states within the meaning of Article 295 EC.
Because Article 295 EC was "irrelevant" to any effect the Directive
might have on particular property rights the tobacco companies had in
their trademarks, 56 the court did not need to determine whether the
Directive actually infringed tobacco companies' intellectual-property
rights.57
B.

Infringement of the FundamentalRight to Property

The tobacco companies also argued that the Directive infringed
their right to property, protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights5 8 and Article 17 of the Charter
50. Pursuant to Article 295 of the EC Treaty, supra note 41. See British Am.
Tobacco, supra note 37, 146.
51. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 146.
52. These governments argued that the Directive allowed tobacco makers to keep
using their trademarks on the packaging's non-warning-label areas and therefore did not
violate TRIPs Article 20. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 146. See also
TRIPs, supra note 42, art. 20.
53. EC Treaty, supra note 41, art. 295. See also British Am. Tobacco, supranote 37,
T 147.
147-48. The court wrote that Article
54. See BritishAm. Tobacco, supra note 37,
295 of the EC Treaty, supra note 41, "merely recognises the power of Member States to
define the rules governing the system of property ownership and does not exclude any
influence whatever of Community law on the exercise of national property rights....
British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 147.
55. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 148.
56. See id.
57. See id. % 147-48.
58. Article I of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights
reads:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in
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of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.59 The Court of Justice
wrote that it had consistently held that the right to property is not
absolute60 but instead is relative to a social function. 6' Therefore, the
right could be restricted, provided any restriction corresponded to the
Community's public-interest objectives and did not amount to a
"disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very
substance of the rights guaranteed." 6 2

any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#Pl Art I (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
59. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37,
144. Article 17 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and freedoms reads:
Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions,
except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided
for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss.
The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the
general interest. 2. Intellectual property shall be protected.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C306)
12, http://www.europarl.europa.eulcharter/pdf/texten.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
60. See Case C-210/03, Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec'y of State for
Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-11893, T 72. Proportionality is also at play in Canadian
jurisprudence. See Canada v. JTI MacDonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, 36.
61. See BritishAm. Tobacco, supra note 37, 149.
62. Id. The court cites the following cases: Case 265/87, Hermann Schrader HS
Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 E.C.R. 2237, T 15; Case C280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, T 78; and Case C-293/97, Queen v.
Sec'y of State for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex
parte H.A. Standley, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2603, 54.
In Standley, the Court of Justice of the European Communities observed that the
right to property "forms part of the general principles of Community law." Case C293/97, Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, exparte H.A. Standley, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2603, 59. Yet the court also
observed that the right to property "does not constitute an unfettered prerogative." Id.
60. The right to property can be denied or restricted, so long as such a denial or
restriction "in fact correspond[s] to objectives of general interest pursued by the
Community and . .. [does] not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference
which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed." Id.
Similarly, in Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the
European Union, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 15, the Court of Justice wrote that
Both the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business form
part of the general principles of Community law. However, those principles are
not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to their social function.
Consequently, the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a
trade or profession may be restricted, particularly in the context of a common
organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute a
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of
the rights guaranteed (Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989]
ECR 2237, paragraph 15).
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While the Directive effectively decreased the surface area on
cigarette packs that tobacco companies could use to display their
trademarks, the court wrote, the trademarks still could be displayed on
non-warning-label areas without prejudicing the substance of the
trademarks.63 Article 5 of the Directive established for Community
states a baseline6 warning-label requirement, the aim of which was to
protect public health once conflicts among labeling laws of member
states were eliminated.6 5 The court held that the relationship between the
trademark restrictions and the public-health purposes they served was
such that Article 5 was "a proportionate restriction on the use of the right
to property compatible with the protection afforded that right by
Community law." 66 Therefore, Article 5 did not unlawfully infringe the
fundamental right to property.67
Likewise, the court upheld Article 7's restrictions on tobacco
makers' trademark rights.6 8 The court conceded that Article 7 did
prevent Japan Tobacco from using its Mild Seven trademark69 but wrote
that Japan Tobacco could still create new trademarks that used nonforbidden descriptors, and that Japan Tobacco could "distinguish its
product by using other distinctive signs." 7 0 Article 7's trademark
restrictions corresponded to the European Community's goal of
protecting public health 7 1 and did not constitute a "disproportionate and
intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of that right." 72
Therefore, Article 7 did not unlawfully infringe the fundamental right to
property.73
C. Infringement ofIntellectual-PropertyRights under TRIPs
The court also refused to strike down the Directive on account of
TRIPs Agreement Article 20 because there was no real conflict between

See also Case 265/87, Hermann Schrader HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v.
Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 E.C.R. 2237, 15.
63. See BritishAm. Tobacco, supra note 37, 150.
64. See, e.g., idat recital 24: "Member States should be able to adopt more stringent
rules concerning tobacco products which they deem necessary to protect public health, in
so far as the rules in the Directive are not prejudiced, and subject to the provisions of the
Treaty."
65. See id. 1 150.
66.

Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. I 150 and 157.
See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, T 157.
Seeid. T27and 152.
Id T 152.

71.

See id. T15 1.

72.
73.

Id. T 153.
See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, T1 153 & 157.
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the two. 74 The court's prior jurisprudence regarded the Directive7 as a
European Community measure whose lawfulness was not to be
determined vis-A-vis TRIPs, an international instrument that was not in
principle "among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the
lawfulness of measures adopted by the Community institutions. ,,76 The
legality of a Community measure such as the Directive would be
determined by World Trade Organization ("WTO") rules only if the
measure expressly referred to WTO provisions or if the Community
intended to implement a measure in the context of the WTO.77 Because
the Directive satisfied neither condition, the Court of Justice did not
judge the Directive in light of the TRIPs Agreement.
II.

R.J. REYNOLDS'S SUIT CHALLENGING THE FSPTCA

The FSPTCA 79 authorizes the FDA to regulate tobacco products8 o
and amends the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act8 to
mandate that cigarette packs and tobacco advertisements display certain
warning labels. 8 2 The FSPTCA requires that the top half of the front and
rear panels of cigarette packs contain one of nine warnings about the
risks of smoking.83 The term "Warning" must appear in capital letters,
be in seventeen-point type or take up 70% of the warning-label area
(whichever is less), and be in "conspicuous and legible" type.84 The
warning text must be black on a white background, or white on a black
background.s Press and poster advertisements must display warnings on
at least 20% of the ad space. The warnings must be in black letters on a
white background, or white letters on a black background. 7
The
FSPTCA also provides that within two years of its enactment, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall issue regulations requiring
color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of tobacco use

74. See id. 154-56.
75. See Council Directive 01/37, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
76. BritishAm. Tobacco, supra note 37, 154.
77. See id. 1l55.
78. See id. 156.
79. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.).
80. See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (2009).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(4) (2009).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2009).
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2009).
87. See id.
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to be displayed in the warning labels of advertisements and cigarette
packs.88
The FSPTCA also amends the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act of 198689 by requiring each smokeless-tobacco
package to display a warning on 30% of both principal display panels. 90
The warnings must be in black text on a white background, or in white
text on a black background. 91
On August 31, 2009, R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard were among six
tobacco companies who sued the FDA in U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky.92 The plaintiffs sought preliminarily and
permanently to enjoin the FDA from enforcing FSPTCA provisions that
The complaint articulates
plaintiffs contended were unconstitutional.
two theories of the FSPTCA's unconstitutionality. First, the FSPTCA
violates the First Amendment's free-speech guarantee by restricting
plaintiffs' right to communicate truthfully with consumers. 94 Second, the
FSPTCA violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process and Takings
clauses.95 Specifically, the tobacco companies argued that FSPTCA
warning requirements infringe and significantly devalue their
trademarks, and therefore deprive plaintiffs of their property without due
process of law. 96 Second, the tobacco companies argued that the
mandated warnings appropriate space on their product packaging and
thus constitute a taking of their private property without just
compensation.9 7
Plaintiffs alleged that they have commercially valuable property
rights in their product packaging, "including the design of the packaging
and the trademarked logos displayed on those packages." 98 Plaintiffs
asserted they have invested significantly in designing their packaging
and the trademarked logos their packaging displays. 99 Plaintiffs also
asserted they have invested in marketing so that their products can be
88.
89.
90.

91.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 4402 (2009).
See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(2)(A) (2009).
See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(2)(B) (2009).

92. Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands, Inc.
v. United States, No. 1:09CV- I117-M (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 2842131.
93. See id T 174-79. See also id. TT 123, 124 & 126 (where plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that the challenged FSPTCA provisions are unconstitutional).
94. See id. 6.
95. See id. TT 30, 66, 119, 134, and Prayers for Relief C & E.
96. Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands, Inc.
v. United States, No. 1:09CV-17-M 11 30 & 134 (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009
WL 2842131.
97. See id. 30, 66 & 119, Prayer for Relief C.
98. Id. $ 64.
99. See id. 64.
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identified according to their packaging design, color and logos. 00 The
complaint suggests that the mandated warning labels will prevent
plaintiffs from meaningfully using product packaging to display their
particular trademarks. 0'
Plaintiffs also focused on the FSPTCA requirement that many press
and poster advertisements be in black and white.102 The Act requires
such black-and-white advertising to contain color graphics of tobaccorelated illness, which graphics plaintiffs allege will "dominate" the
advertisements and likely result in viewers internalizing only the
government's anti-tobacco message. 0 3 Plaintiffs argued that banning
colors in many of their advertisements amounts to a Fifth Amendment
taking.104 In sum, plaintiffs argued that the FSPTCA deprives them of
their trademarks and trade dress without just compensation. os
To be granted relief on a Fifth Amendment takings claims, plaintiffs
must establish at least two things. First, they must show that trademarks
or trade dress are a constitutionally cognizable property interest.106
Second, they must demonstrate that the challenged FSPTCA provisions
amount to a taking of such property.
A.

Are Trademarks Property?

The complaint alleges that FSPTCA warning-label provisions
violate the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings and Due
Process clauses.107 Although the complaint does not cite case law to
support its takings claim, 0 8 the complaint as originally filed raises
100. See id
101. See Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV-l 1l7-M 65 (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL
2842131.
102. See id.'61.
103. Id.
104. Seeid119.
105. See id. 66.
106. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implicationsfor
Eminent Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 374 (2009) (without a showing that
something may be considered private property, "constitutional protection of private
property rights is not implicated. . . ."). Professor Merrill has also written that the Due
Process and Takings clauses "appear to impose a threshold condition that a claimant have
some 'property' at stake before the protections associated with the Clause apply."
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty,86 VA. L. REv. 885, 886
(2000).
107. Plaintiffs' complaint does not mention the Lanham Act or allege that the
FSPTCA conflicts with the Lanham Act.
108. See, e.g., Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth
Brands, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV-I 17-M (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009
WL 2842131, %30, 66, 119, and Prayer for Relief E (none of these sections cites case
law).
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interesting questions about trademark rights. Are trademarks property?
Is trade dress property? If they are property, to what extent can
government regulate them? To prevail on a Fifth Amendment takings
claim, plaintiffs must show that trademarks or trade dress are a
constitutionally cognizable property interest.109
Civil-law countries generally regard trademarks as property."10
Trademark rights in these jurisdictions typically arise out of
registration"'-whoever registers a trademark first acquires property
rights in that mark." 2 Conversely, in the United States, where trademark
law is rooted in common law, trademark rights arise out of usewhoever uses a mark in commerce first acquires rights in the mark." 3
Another important distinction between civil-law and common-law
jurisdictions is that the former tend to permit assignments in gross of
trademarks, whereas such transfers cannot be effectuated in the latter."14
An assignment in gross occurs when a trademark holder transfers a
trademark to another party "without the appurtenant goodwill."' 15
At common law, trademarks "have never been property.""6 A
trademark holder has only the right to exclude others from using the
109. According to Professor Merrill, since Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), "the Court has become increasingly insistent that persons seeking protection for
economic interests under either the Due Process or Takings Clauses must establish they
have 'property' if they are to avoid dismissal of their lawsuit." Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 887 (2000).
110. See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark
Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 831 (2000).
111. See id at 832-33.
112. See id. at 833.
113. See id
114. See id
115. Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A
Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (2000). Professor
Port writes that it is possible for civil-law systems to treat trademarks as assignable in
gross

because the underlying justification of civil law systems is to protect the
trademark owner and encourage it to invest in the reputation of the company,
and preventing consumers from confusion is only a means to that end.
Therefore, it is permissible for Company A to assign to Company B (regardless
of their respective competitive position) its rights in trademark Z without
ceasing production of the good or service on which mark Z was used. Company
B can immediately commence use of mark Z on identical products. Providing
that the mark has been assigned from Company A to Company B, the fact that
consumers might be confused as to the source or origin of the goods bearing
mark Z is irrelevant. The rationale is that even though consumers might be
confused about the source, products bearing mark Z still come from one source,
although the consumers might be mistaken about what entity that might be.
Id.
116. Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV.
519, 552 (1993). See also Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the United States and
Japan, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 667, 678 (2008).
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mark on similar goods."' 7 By contrast, owners of patents and copyrights
enjoy the right to alienate and exclusively control their work."' 8 The
right to use a symbol to distinguish one's goods from others' "has been
long recognized by the common law. . ."119 The right to use a
trademark is a property right,12 0 but "in a common law system such as the
United States, the mark itself is not subject to property ownership."'21
The Lanham Act 2 2 largely codifies the common-law approach to
trademarks.12 3 The Lanham Act defines "trademark" to include "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' used to
identify and distinguish the user's goods "from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source
is unknown." 2 4 This definition is broad. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that a mere color may meet "ordinary legal trademark requirements"
and that "when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from
serving as a trademark." 25 The term "trademark" also encompasses
"trade dress," which the Lanham Act protects from infringement. 2 6
Trade dress connotes "the total look of a product and its packaging and
even includes the design and shape of the product itself." 2 7 According
to the Supreme Court, trade dress originally included "only the
packaging, or 'dressing,' of a product, but in recent years has been
expanded by many Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a
product.... These courts have assumed, often without discussion, that
117.

See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
See also SHELDON W. HALPERN, CRAIG ALLEN NARD &

REV. 519, 552, 553 (1993).

KENNETH L. PORT, FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:

COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK 347 (2d ed. 2007).

118.

See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.

REV. 519, 552, 553 (1993).

119. Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper Nat. Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 803 (6th Cir.
1996).
120. See id.
121. HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 347.
122. Lanham Act, c. 540, 60 Stat. 437 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1072, 191-196, 1111-1127, 1141, 1141a-n (2006)).
123. Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the United States and Japan, 17
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 667, 680 (2008) ("[Tlhe Lanham Act is a statute

which is supposed to codify the common law of trademarks. In the legislative history of
the Lanham Act, the authors expressly state that it is a statute that codifies common law
and is not intended to change or enlarge the common law." Professor Port cites S. Rep.
No. 1333 (1946).).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997).
125. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1995). In
emphasizing the Lanham Act's expansive definition of "trademark," Justice Breyer
wrote: "If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a
color not do the same?" 514 U.S. at 162.
126. HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326. See also 15 U.S.C. § l125(a)(3) (1999).
127. 1 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
also HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326.

§ 8:4

(4th ed. 2008); see
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trade dress constitutes a 'symbol' or 'device'

likewise."

. .
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and we conclude

128

The United States Constitution refers to patents and copyrights but
not trademarks.1 2 9 In light of this distinction, the U.S. Supreme Court in
a nineteenth-century case called In re Trade-Mark Cases130 struck down
the Trademark Act of 1870, which, according to Professor Port, had been
an attempt by Congress to give trademarks property status.13 ' The
defendants in In re Trade-Mark Cases were indicted on criminal charges
of violating the Trademark Act.' 32 The Court held that Congress could
not, on the basis of the Constitution's Copyright Clause, which does not
refer to trademarks, vest trademark holders with more rights than the
right to exclude others from using their marks.13 3 To grant new
trademark rights based on the Copyright Clause was to exercise an
invalid Congressional power because the Copyright Clause did not
specifically mention trademarks,13 4 and such an exercise of power would
improperly intrude on states' powers to regulate "property in trademarks
and the right to their exclusive use. . . ."135 The Trade-Mark Cases3 6

128. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sumara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). See also
HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326.
129. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark
Incontestability,26 IND. L. REv. 519, 553 (1993).
130. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
131. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
REV. 519, 553 (1993).
132. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 91.
133. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
REv. 519, 554 (1993).
134. See id. at 552.
135. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93. The Court wrote:
As the property in trade-marks and the right to their exclusive use rest on the
laws of the States, and, like the great body of the rights of person and of
property, depend on them for security and protection, the power of Congress to
legislate on the subject, to establish the conditions on which these rights shall
be enjoyed and exercised, the period of their duration, and the legal remedies
for their enforcement, if such power exist at all, must be found in the
Constitution of the United States, which is the source of all powers that
Congress can lawfully exercise.
Id. Writes Professor Port:
since trademark rights are not part of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, they are protected through federal legislation, if at all, by the
Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause has been subject to the most drastic
shifts in interpretation of perhaps any clause of the Constitution. The
trademark right is a very important asset of any corporation. It seems a bit
tenuous to have such an important asset rest on the malleable Commerce
Clause.
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 910-11 (2000).
136. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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Court did not reach the issue of whether Congress could regulate
trademarks pursuant to the Commerce Clause.' 37
The Court limited the scope of the In re Trade-Mark Casesl38
holding in the 1918 case United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,139
in which a Massachusetts corporation sued to enjoin the alleged
infringement of its trademark by a Kentucky corporation.' 4 0 The Court
wrote that a trademark is not a right in gross, and that in this respect
trademarks differ from copyrights and patents.14 1 That a trademark is not
a right in gross means that "[t]here is no such thing as property in a
trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed."1 4 2 The Court also
wrote that
[p]roperty in trade-marks and the right to their exclusive use rest
upon the laws of the several states, and depend upon them for
security and protection; the power of Congress to legislate on the
subject being only such as arises from the authority to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with
the Indian tribes. 143
Thus, whereas In re Trade-Mark Cases establishes that Congress may
not regulate trademarks pursuant to the Copyright and Patent Clause,
Theodore Rectanus suggests Congress may regulate trademarks pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.'"
Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that whether trademarks are
property is not a settled issue.14 5 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,14 6 the
137. See id. at 95.
138. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
139. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
140. See id. at 93.
141. See id. at 97.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 98 (citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879)). See also
Kenneth L. Port, The CongressionalExpansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 837 (2000) (though Professor
Port does not discuss Rectanus, he writes that the In re Trade-Mark Cases Court "found
the Trademark Act of 1870 unconstitutional because it was grounded in Art. 1, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution (the Patent and Copyright Clause) rather than the Commerce
Clause.").
144. In the United States, "federal regulation of trademark rights gain[s] legitimacy
through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution ...
Kenneth L. Port, The
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the
Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 830-31 (2000). See also Kenneth L. Port,
JudgingDilution in the United States andJapan, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
667, 680 (2008). Thus, were Congress to pass legislation that broke from the common
law and gave trademark holders property rights, the Trade-Mark holding would not likely
pertain to such a statute, provided Congress enacted it pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
145. Professor Port contends that
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Court held that a trade secret is property that the Fifth Amendment
protects.147 In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed that trade
secrets "have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of
property" in that trade secrets are assignable, can serve as the corpus of a
trust, and pass to a trustee in bankruptcy.148 Trademarks exhibit each of
these characteristics. Trademarks can be assets of a bankruptcy estate,149
which means courts can order the involuntary sale of trademarks.' 50

legislative changes enacted by Congress in the last decade have moved the
American system of trademark jurisprudence much closer to the civil law
perspective and, therefore, much closer to recognizing trademarks themselves
as subject to property ownership. I do not argue that this change is normatively
wrong. I only argue that this change is inconsistent with American common
law and, perhaps, even the American Constitution.
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (2000).
146. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
147. See id. at 1003-04.
148. Id. at 1002.
149. See, e.g., Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d
925, 931 (7th Cir. 1985).
150. See id. The Seventh Circuit wrote:
It is true that a trademark is not a property right in gross which may be sold
apart from the business or goodwill with which the trademark has been
associated. Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.1984); Mister Donut
of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir.1969); J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:9 (1973) ("If the
tangible assets of a bankrupt are sold without goodwill or trademarks being
sold, the trademark ceases to exist."). But a trademark is a form of property,
Intemat'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th
Cir.1981); People ex rel. Scott v. Cardet Internat'l, Inc., 24 Ill.App.3d 740, 321
N.E.2d 386, 390 (1974), which exists in connection with the goodwill or
tangible assets of a business." See also AMJUR Trademarks §4 (second
edition, Trademarks and Tradenames, by John Kimpflen, J.D.: United Drug Co.
v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 39 S. Ct. 48, 63 L. Ed. 141 (1919);
Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir.
1998). A 'trademark' is a form of property which exists in connection with the
goodwill or tangible assets of a business.
Id.
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Trademarks can also be assigned,' 5 ' and they can constitute the corpus of
a trust.15 2
Trademarks exhibit other qualities that other traditionally
recognized types of property exhibit. For example, liens'5 3 and security
interests 54 can attach to trademarks. Even if, as some scholars argue, a
trademark is nothing when divorced from the goodwill of a business, 55
to the extent that trademarks are business assets 56 it would seem proper
that they receive constitutional protection as property because "[t]he
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (2009). Although trademarks cannot be assigned
without (at least an indication of) goodwill, this restriction on alienation is, in practice,
slight. A common practice for companies is to transfer their trademarks to a wholly
owned trademark holding company and then have the holding company license the
trademarks back to the transferor company. This type of transaction is effectuated for tax
purposes. See, e.g., R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue, 229 P.3d
266, 274-75 (Ariz. App. Div. 2010); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187,
189 (N.C. App. 2004); March Madness Athletic Ass'n, LLC. v. Netfire, Inc., 310
F.Supp.2d 786, 800-01 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Surtees v. VFJ Ventures, Inc., 8 So.3d 950,
956-57 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). See also Deborah Diehl, Is the IP Holding Company
Dead? 37 MD. BAR J. 43 (Feb. 2004).
152. See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 123 F.Supp.2d 731, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 129 F.Supp.2d 248, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
153. See, e.g., Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d
925, 927 (7th Cir. 1985). See also In re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 98 B.R. 250, 250
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (where debtor gave creditors a security interest in four of
debtor's trademarks).
154. See generally In re TR-3 Industries, 41 B.R. 128, 131-32 (1984) (where the court
concluded a creditor had a "valid, duly perfected and effective security interest in" the
debtor's trademarks); In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1986) (a
security interest in a trademark can be assigned in gross if the security interest does not
attach to equipment used to produce trademarked goods); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d
927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (a trademark cannot be sold apart from the goodwill it
represents.).
155. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
REv. 519, 553 (1993) ("Mark holders do not possess a property right in the mark itself,
because trademarks are nothing when devoid of the goodwill they have come to represent
or the product on which they are used.").
156. See Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 904 F. Supp. 1363, 1366
(M.D. Fla. 1995) ("Miller's trademark is an intangible asset of the corporation
representing the corporation's reputation and goodwill."). A trademark is a business
asset. One scholar has written that trademarks function to identify products, to
differentiate products from others, and to help develop unique "brand personas." Robert
N. Klieger, TrademarkDilution: The Whittling Away of the RationalBasisfor Trademark
Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 789 (1997). "Taken together, these functions of
trademarks as product, source, and quality identifiers, and as vessels for the development
of brand personas, elevate trademarks above physical assets and other forms of
intellectual property as the most valuable assets of many companies." Id The
trademarks of Coca-Cola and Microsoft have been valued at more than $70 billion each.
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 585, 586 (2008) (citing Suhejla Hoti, Michael McAleer & Daniel Slottje,
Intellectual PropertyLitigation Activity in the United States, 20 J. ECON. SURV. 715, 715
(2006)).
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assets of a business (including its good will) unquestionably are property,
and any state taking of those assets is unquestionably a 'deprivation'
under the Fourteenth Amendment."l 57
Importantly, Lanham Act amendments have given trademark
holders more rights in their marks than trademark holders enjoyed when
the statute originally codified the common law in 1946.158 Some courts
and scholars regard two amendments in particular-the statute's
incontestabilityl 59 and anti-dilution amendmentsl60-as an attempt by

157. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board,
527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
158. See Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the United States and Japan, 17
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 667, 680 (2008). In other scholarship, Professor
Port points to a trend of recent trademark-law changes that he believes "drastically
expands the boundaries of what the common law had long settled as the scope of
American trademark right." Kenneth L. Port, The CongressionalExpansion of American
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 830
(2000). Professor Port says these statutory changes include a Lanham Act amendment
that permits applicants to reserve trademarks that they intend to use in commerce (the
amendment of 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) and a 1999 Lanham Act
amendment that makes statutory damages available if a cybersquatter uses a trademarked
name as an Internet domain name. See Kenneth L. Port, The CongressionalExpansion of
American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
827, 829 (2000).
159. Incontestability is provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1065. Incontestability essentially
refers to the incontestable right of a holder of a registered mark to use the mark in
commerce, provided, among other conditions, that the trademark has been registered and
continuously used for five years. See Port, Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of
TrademarkIncontestability,26 IND. L. REv. 519, 562 & 569 (1993). See also Kenneth L.
Port, The CongressionalExpansion of American TrademarkLaw: A Civil Law System in
the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 828 n.3 (2000), where Professor Port argues
that the incontestability provisions added to the Lanham Act "seem to contemplate
recognition of the trademark itself as property even though the common law has never
treated the trademark as property." Professor Port cites other scholars who agree with his
view.
160. Antidilution is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125. The statute establishes a cause of
action for dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring. Tarnishment and blurring
both refer to an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark...." 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(2)(C). Dilution by tarnishment refers to
such association as "harms the reputation of the famous mark." 15 U.S.C.
§ l125(c)(2)(C). Dilution by blurring refers to such association as "impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark." 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(2)(B). See HALPERN ET AL.,
supra note 117, at 293. "Certainly, [Lanham Act] 43(c) grants new trademark rights not
previously contemplated by the Lanham Act. It remains to be seen how significant 43(c)
will actually be on the practice of trademark law in the United States." HALPERN ET AL.,
supra note 117, at 299. "Perhaps because of the newness of the doctrine [of dilution] and
perhaps because the concept of dilution does not fit within the conceptual justifications of
trademark protection in the United States, its application by courts has been confused and
unpredictable at best." HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 361. In Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003), the Court wrote that trademark dilution did
not arise from common law. See also Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the United
States andJapan, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 667, 678 (2008):
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Congress to treat trademarks as property.161 Although R.J. Reynolds did
not allege that FSPTCA-mandated warning labels violate the Lanham
Act, the viability of the tobacco maker's Takings Clause argument may
depend on whether Congress has amended the Lanham Act such that it
vests trademark holders with sufficient property rights to implicate the
federal Constitution, notwithstanding In re Trade-Mark Cases.162 In
other words, even if FSPTCA-mandated warning labels do not implicate
the Lanham Act's definition of infringement or dilution, the Lanham
Act's mere recognition of dilution and incontestability might be a trend
toward giving trademarks and trade dress the property status requisite for
a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Litigation regarding property rights in
trademarks or trade dress will likely hinge on whether Lanham Act
amendments depart from the common law such that trademarks or trade
dress vest holders with more rights than solely the right to exclude
others.
A 1999 Supreme Court opinion suggests that the Lanham Act does
break from the common law and that trademarks may confer
constitutionally protected property interests.

[T]o embrace a civil law notion of trademark dilution, the United States must
accept that civil law jurisdictions treat the trademark right itself as if it were
property. In the United States, trademarks themselves are not subject to
property ownership. A party in the United States may not own a word. A party
may only own the right to exclude others from using your appellation of source
to the extent you use it and as long as you use it. This was the "law and the
Prophets" of trademark law, according to Judge Learned Hand. Dilution
changes this. In order to make sense of trademark dilution in the United States,
one must accept the idea that some trademarks are worth more. Some
trademarks should be protected normatively, i.e., with or without statutory
support. The justification for this protection is that the distinctive capacity of,
for example, kodak is reduced if we allow a non-competitor to use the mark
kodak on bicycles.
161. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199-201 (1985).
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas wrote in a 2008 case that "Dilution
causes of action, much more so than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very
close to granting 'rights in gross' in a trademark." Board of Regents ex rel. University of
Texas System v. KST Electric, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 674 (W.D. Tex. 2008). Yet in
DeCosta v. Viacom Intern. Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 609 (1st Cir. 1992), the court, citing
Rectanus, wrote that trademark rights are not rights in gross. The U.S. Supreme Court
denied certiorari. DeCosta v. Viacom Intern. 509 U.S. 923 (1993). The Seventh Circuit
has also written that "[e]ven antidilution statutes ... do not elevate a trademark all the
way to property." Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc, 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th
Cir. 1996).
162. Professor Port asserts that Congress has "worked mightily" to base the Lanham
Act on the Commerce Clause, as opposed to the Copyright and Patent Clause. Kenneth
L. Port, The CongressionalExpansion ofAmerican Trademark Law: A Civil Law System
in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 839 (2000). If Congress succeeded, then In
re Trade-Mark Cases would be minimally significant today.
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The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others. That is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.'. . . The Lanham Act
may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable
property interests-notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of
trademarks, which are the 'property' of the owner because he can
exclude others from using them. See, e.g., K mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-186, 108 S.Ct. 950, 99 L.Ed.2d 151 (1988)
('Trademark law, like contract law, confers private rights, which are
themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a
bundle of such rights[.]'). 163
A simple argument could be made to assert that trademarks are property
that the Constitution protects. The first premise is that the goodwill of a
business is property. Support for this proposition is found in College

Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
where the Supreme Court, in discussing due process, wrote that "assets
of a business (including its good will) unquestionably are property, and
any state taking of those assets is unquestionably a 'deprivation' under
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 6 4 The second premise is that a trademark
is nothing when dissociated from a firm's goodwill,165 and a firm's
goodwill encompasses the firm's trademarks. Thus, insofar as warning
labels impair trademarks or trade dress, they undermine the mark

163.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527

U.S. 666, 673 (1999). For a helpful discussion of College Saving's significance, see
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 908916 (2000). Notably, the American Intellectual Property Law Association sought to
submit an amicus brief in College Savings arguing that trademarks are property and thus
"are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on state deprivations of
property. Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Brief for Respondent, College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (1999
WL 160315).
164. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 675 (1999). The College Savings Court does not seem to suggest that a federal
taking of such assets would not be a deprivation under the Fifth Amendment.
165. Although he takes an opposing view, viz., that there is no property right in a
trademark itself, Professor Port argues that "trademarks are nothing when devoid of the
goodwill they have come to represent or the product on which they are used." Kenneth
L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability,26 IND. L. REv. 519, 553 (1993).
In Adams Apple DistributingCo. v. PapelerasReunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d 925, 931 (7th Cir.
1985), the court wrote: "It is true that a trademark is not a property right in gross which
may be sold apart from the business or goodwill with which the trademark has been
associated... . But a trademark is a form of property ... which exists in connection with
the goodwill or tangible assets of a business." See also 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks § 4
(2009) (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1919); Krebs
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998)).
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holder's goodwill and, in this respect, impair a constitutionally protected
property interest of the holder.'66
But if a specific type of property is protectable under the Fourteenth
Amendment, does it necessarily follow that such property is also
protectable under the Fifth Amendment? And is "property" for dueprocess purposes the same as "property" for takings purposes? 6 7
Another problem with this argument is that it is not clear FSPTCAmandated warning labels must be superimposed over the plaintiffs'
Rather, tobacco companies might simply make their
trademarks.
trademarks smaller to fill up the non-warning-label space on cigarette
packs. The warning label would simply prompt tobacco companies to
shrink their trademarks and would not alter or appropriate the
trademarks' content. Tobacco makers could respond by asserting that
the size and conspicuous, unattributed nature of the warning label
directly harms their goodwill, thereby impairing a constitutionally
protected property interest. Alternatively, tobacco companies might
argue that the warning labels infringe their trademarks because
trademarks are property, "trademark" encompasses "trade dress," and the
warning labels adversely impact their trade dress.
B.

Is Trade Dress Property?

Even if FSPTCA warning labels do not deprive tobacco companies
of their trademarks, the warning labels may still deprive tobacco
companies of their trade dress insofar as the warning labels affect the
overall look of cigarette packs. If nothing else, a black-and-white
warning label placed on half the front panel of a cigarette pack

166. This argument is not likely to please Professor Port, who has observed:
American trademark law walks a very fine line. In our federal constitutional
system, there have been three specific objectives to trademark protection:
protect consumers from confusion, protect the goodwill of the producer, and
protect third parties' rights to compete. The expansion of trademark rights in
America ... results in an inextricable shifting of this fine balance to grossly
favor the protection of the goodwill of holders of trademark rights.
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 910 (2000).
167. The Seventh Circuit has held that "property" for takings purposes is not the same
as "property" for due-process purposes. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Jay
County, Indiana, 57 F.3d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit supported its
position by citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 245, 255 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court held that welfare benefits could not be taken away without giving the recipient
notice and a chance to be heard. Yet in Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 961
(7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit wrote that the Takings Clause did not apply to an
allegedly improper removal of welfare benefits. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in
Eco-Pro that "[t]he Due Process Clause ... recognizes a wider range of interests as
property than does the Takings Clause." 57 F.3d 505 at 513.
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noticeably changes the look of an item whose surface previously was
saturated with color.
The definition of trademark seems broad enough to encompass16 1
trade dress 1 69 because the Lanham Act broadly 70 defines trademark to
include any word, name, symbol, or "any combination thereof,"' 7 1 and
because the design or overall appearance of a product's packaging is
reducible to a specific combination of colors,17 2 symbols, words and
names.17 3 That a trademark can be "any combination" of words, names
or symbols 7 4 suggests that "trademark" covers any particular
combination of trademarks arranged in a specific way on a product's
packaging. Therefore, even if FSPTCA warning labels do not prevent
tobacco companies from displaying particular trademarks on cigarette
packs-that is, even if the warning labels appear in a way that does not
prevent tobacco companies from displaying individual symbols, names,
colors or words around the warning labels-still, the warning labels will
prevent tobacco companies from displaying the particular combination of
words, colors, symbols, designs and names (the particular set of
trademarks) that they had printed on cigarette packs previously. The
warning labels will significantly alter the overall look of cigarette packs
and thus affect tobacco companies' trade dress. If trademarks are
constitutionally protected property interests, and if "trademark"
encompasses "trade dress," then tobacco companies will more likely
prevail on a Fifth Amendment takings claim regarding trade dress than
on a claim 7 5 on their individual trademarks.
British Am. Tobacco 7 6 did not address whether the European
Community-mandated warning labels infringed tobacco companies'
trade dress.17 7 The Court of Justice addressed only whether the Directive
prejudiced the substance of certain individual trademarks that the

168. See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326. See also 15 U.S.C. § I125(a)(3)
(1999).
169. See I MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:4 (4th ed. 2008);
HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326.
170. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997).
172. The Supreme Court has written that a color may suffice as a trademark. See
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160-62 (1995).
173. The Supreme Court has assumed without discussion that "trademark"
encompasses "trade dress." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sumara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,
209 (2000).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997).
175. See Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV-1 l7-M (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL
2842131, 55.
176. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37.
177. See id.
11 149-153.
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petitioning tobacco companies placed on cigarette packs.'7 8 The court
concluded that the Directive merely increased the size of previously
required warning labels in a way that left enough space on cigarette
packs on which tobacco companies could print their individual

trademarks.1 79
C.

Do FSPTCA-MandatedWarning Labels Constitute a Taking of
Plaintiffs' Trademarks or Trade Dress?

To prevail on a takings claim, plaintiffs must show that the
mandated warning labels constitute a taking of their property. The Fifth
Amendment's Takings and Due Process clauses limit the conditions
under which the federal government may deprive a person of his or her
property.'so The Due Process Clause states that the government may not
deprive a person of his or her property without due process."' The
Takings Clause' 8 2 states that the government may not deprive a person of
his or her private property unless two conditions are satisfied: the private
property is taken for a public purpose, and the individual is justly
compensated.' 83 In Kelo v. City of New London,184 the Court wrote that
"public purpose" has a broad definition, and that the Court tends to defer
to the opinion of Congress as to what constitutes a public purpose.' 8 5
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'86 the Court recognized that
excessive government regulation could amount to a taking.' 8 7 Thus, the
Court's jurisprudence distinguishes between physical and regulatory
takings.'8 8 Since Pennsylvania Coal, "neither a physical appropriation
nor a public use has ever been a necessary component of a 'regulatory
taking."'l 89

178. Seeid. 1150.
179. See id. % 132 and 150.
180. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Future of the Regulatory Takings Issue in the United
States and Europe: Divergence or Convergence? 40 URB. LAW 51, 52 (2008).
181. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
182. Id.
183. See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003).
See also Jacobs, supra note 180, at 53.
184. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
185. See id. at 480.
186. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
187. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325-26 (2002)).
188. See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (citing
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321-23 (2002)).
189. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002)).

832

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

When the government physically takes possession of private
property, "it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner."'so
However, when the government regulates property, determining whether
the regulation amounts to a taking "necessarily entails complex factual
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government
actions."'91 The Court conducts a fact-based analysis of the particular
circumstances of the case 92 based on factors described in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York.19 3 The Penn CentralCourt held that for
regulatory-takings cases, factors relevant to whether a regulation effects
a taking include the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations."' 94 Also relevant is whether the
government's action is better characterized as a "physical invasion"l95 or
as "interference aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 9 6
The Tahoe Court added that the length of time that a government
restriction affects property rights is important to the analysis.' 97
European law differs from American law on the topic of regulatory
takings.l1i Many European countries have civil-law legal systems based
on the Napoleonic Code of 1804.199 The Napoleonic Code itself
interprets Roman law,200 which recognized two kinds of authority over
property: dominium and imperium. 2 0 1 Dominium is a landowner's right
to use his or her property. 20 2 Imperium is the government's power to
infringe the landowner's dominium in order to promote public welfare.203
The interaction of dominium and imperium, however, does not yield an
190. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (citing
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002)).
191. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
192. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
193. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 & 342 (2002).
194. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
195. Id. at 124.
196. Id.
197. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337 (2002) ("[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a
land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it
should not be given exclusive significance one way or the other.").
198. See generally Jacobs, supra note 180.
199. See id. at 59.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id
203. See Jacobs, supra note 180, at 59.
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European
individual right against government regulation.2 04
governments have the right to regulate private property, "often onerously
from a United States perspective," 205 based on the right of imperium. 20 6
Neither national nor European law recognizes regulatory takings. 2 0 7
In Europe a sharp divide exists between regulation and taking, the latter
characterized as a physical appropriation of property.20 8 Professor
Harvey Jacobs notes that some European constitutions further sharpen
the regulation-taking dichotomy by positing social rights in property
rights. 2 09 This seems to be precisely what the Court of Justice recognizes
in British Am. Tobacco2 10 where it asserts that the fundamental right to
property is not absolute but is rather relative to its social function.211 As
noted above, British Am. Tobacco2 12 leaves the regulatory-takings issue
largely untouched.
Tobacco companies would likely prefer to argue that the FSPTCA is
a physical rather than a regulatory taking of their property. The first
reason for this preference is that the U.S. Supreme Court applies a clear,
if the
straightforward, categorical rule in physical-takings cases:
government physically takes possession of a person's property, then the
government must compensate the person.2 1 Alternatively, in cases
involving government regulation, the fact-sensitive analysiS2 14 that the
judiciary conducts precludes the government from having a clear-cut
categorical duty to compensate the property owner.
Moreover,
government regulation that "bans certain private uses of a portion of an
owner's property .. . does not constitute a categorical taking" 2 15 but
rather requires the judiciary to conduct "complex factual assessments of
,,216
When
the purposes and economic effects of government actions.
conducting such an assessment, the Court "does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in

204. See id.
205. Id. at 60.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Jacobs, supra note 180, at 60.
209. See id.
210. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37.
211. Seeid.1149.
212. See generally id.
213. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
214. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
215. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)).
216. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
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a particular segment have been entirely abrogated" 2 17 but rather focuses
on an affected parcel of property as a whole. Thus, restrictions on how a
limited area of a given parcel may be used, setback ordinances being an
example, do not amount to regulatory takings.218
Regardless of the theory that tobacco companies advance, they will
not likely be granted relief on a takings claim. Even if trademarks or
trade dress are a constitutionally cognizable property interest, FSPTCA
warning labels are neither a physical nor a regulatory taking. The
government has not physically taken possession of the warning-label
area of cigarette packs. The government has not sought take possession
of the trademarks and license them back to the tobacco companies. The
government has not outright forbid tobacco companies from using their
trademarks. Rather, the government is regulating what certain portions
of cigarette packaging must display. Such regulation does not likely
amount to a taking. Instead, the warning labels on cigarette packs
resemble a regulation, such as a setback ordinance, which is not a
taking, 219 that prevents a private-property owner from freely using a
particular parcel of his or her real estate. Just as a setback ordinance
forbids a property owner from erecting a structure on a particular zone of
his or her land, so too the FSPTCA forbids tobacco companies from
freely using the top half of the front of cigarette packs to display their
trademarks. Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates the proper analysis
involves taking stock of the surface area of the cigarette pack as a whole,
rather than focusing solely on the areas of the cigarette pack that exhibit
the mandated warning labels. The Court's jurisprudence on setback
ordinances suggests that restrictions on how cigarette-pack surfaces may
be used may not amount to a regulatory taking.220
III. CONCLUSION
As governments take new legal steps to discourage tobacco use,
tobacco companies protect their interests by impugning the legal steps
that governments take. In few regions is this more evident than the
United States and Europe. Recently tobacco companies221 challenged the
217. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 130-31 (1978)).
218. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002) (citing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927)).
219. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
220. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002) (citing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927)).
221. See Complaint for Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et. al., Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09CV- I117-M (D. W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL
2842131.
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FSPTCA on the basis that it violates the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.222 To prevail on such a claim, tobacco
companies would need to establish that trademarks or trade dress are
property, and that FSPTCA-mandated warning labels effect a taking of
that property.
Trademarks have a different legal status in Europe than they do in
the United States. In British Am. Tobacco, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities apparently assumed 2 23 that trademarks are
property. This assumption is consonant with Professor Port's contention
that civil-law systems tend to regard trademarks as subject to property
ownership. 224 But European law has largely eschewed the issue of
whether government-mandated warning labels on cigarette packs
constitute a taking. 2 2 5 Nor has European litigation addressed whether
trade dress is property.226
I believe that trademarks exhibit many of the characteristics that
more classic forms of property exhibit. Trademarks are assignable, 2 2 7
can serve as the corpus of a trust,2 2 8 become part of a bankruptcy
estate,229 can be hypothecated,23 0 and have extraordinary value.23'
222. See id. $T 30, 66, 119, 134, and Prayers for Relief C & E.
223. See British Am. Tobacco, supra note 37, 1 25, 149-154 (the Court of Justice
addresses whether the Directive infringes the fundamental right to property by inhibiting
claimants' use of their trademarks).
224. See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark
Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 831 (2000).
225. See Jacobs, supra note 180, at 60.
226. See International Trademark Association, Trade Dress Protection in Europe,
(last
http://www.inta.org/images/stories/downloads/PDA/2007_tradedressreport.pdf
visited Jan. 6, 2010), p. 4.
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (1997).
228. See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 123 F.Supp.2d 731, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 129 F.Supp.2d 248, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
229. See, e.g., Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d
925, 931 (7th Cir. 1985).
230. See, e.g., Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d
925, 927 (7th Cir. 1985). See also In re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 98 B.R. 250, 250
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (where debtor gave creditors a security interest in four of
debtor's trademarks). See generally In re TR-3 Industries, 41 B.R. 128, 131-32 (1984)
(where the court concluded a creditor had a "valid, duly perfected and effective security
interest in" the debtor's trademarks); In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 208-09
(6th Cir. 1986) (a security interest in a trademark is a proper assignment in gross if the
security interest does not attach to equipment used to produce trademarked goods);
Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (trademarks cannot be assigned in
gross; in other words, trademarks cannot be sold apart from its goodwill. "A trade name
or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent significance apart from the
goodwill it symbolizes.... [A] trademark cannot be sold or assigned apart from to
goodwill it symbolizes.").
231. The trademarks of Coca-Cola and Microsoft have been valued at more than $70
billion each. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of TrademarkLaw, 65
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Although trademarks are not assignable in grOSS232 but rather are
appurtenant to the goodwill of a business, 23 3 such goodwill is a
constitutionally protected form of property. 23 If trademarks cannot be
impaired without impairing a going concern's goodwill, then trademarks
might be considered a constitutionally cognizable property interest.
If trademarks are property, then trade dress is also property because
the Lanham Act defines trademarks as symbols, as well as any
combination thereof.235 In other words, a trademark can be a
combination of marks. Because trade dress is reducible to a combination
of trademarks, "trademark" encompasses "trade dress."236
The FSPTCA more likely deprives tobacco companies of their trade
dress than it deprives them of their individual trademarks. The statute
allows tobacco companies to display individual-though smallertrademarks on their cigarette packs but prevents tobacco companies from
displaying the specific combination of trademarks they have hitherto
displayed. A warning label that takes up half the front panel of a
cigarette pack significantly affects the overall look or appearance of the
packaging.
Even if trademarks and trade dress are property, the FSPTCA
probably does not amount to a Fifth Amendment taking. The FSPTCA
does not effect a physical taking of tobacco makers' marks or trade dress
because the government is not in possession of them. Tobacco makers
can still decide how to situate their individual marks around the
mandated warning labels. Nor does the FSPTCA effect a regulatory
taking. That a setback ordinance does not effect a regulatory taking237
suggests, by analogy, that warning labels on cigarette packs do not effect
a regulatory taking, either.
To protect their interests, tobacco companies have advanced an
interesting theory of how the FSPTCA violates the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause. How issues at the core of this theory should be resolved
will doubtless be the subject of more thorough legal scholarship.
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 586 (2008) (citing Suhejla Hoti, Michael McAleer & Daniel
Slottje, Intellectual Property Litigation Activity in the United States, 20 J. ECON. SURV.
715, 715 (2006)).
232. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
233. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of TrademarkIncontestability, 26 IND. L.
REv. 519, 553 (1993) ("Mark holders do not possess a property right in the mark itself,
because trademarks are nothing when devoid of the goodwill they have come to represent
or the product on which they are used.").
234. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997).
236. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sumara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). See
also HALPERN ET AL., supra note 117, at 326.
237. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).

